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Evolutionary game theory has been an important tool for describing economic and social be-
haviour for decades. Approximate mean value equations describing the time evolution of strategy
concentrations can be derived from the players’ microscopic update rules. We show that they can
be generalized to a learning process. As an example, we compare a restricted imitation process,
in which unused parts of the role model’s meta-strategy are hidden from the imitator, with the
widely used imitation rule that allows the imitator to adopt the entire meta-strategy of the role
model. This change in imitation behaviour greatly affects dynamics and stationary states in the
iterated prisoner dilemma. Particularly we find Grim Trigger to be a more successful strategy than
Tit-For-Tat especially in the weak selection regime.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 87.19.lv, 87.23.Cc, 87.23.Ge
I. INTRODUCTION
In evolutionary game theory [1–4] the success of selfish
individuals (players) is determined by their interaction
with other players. The most extensively studied evo-
lutionary two player game is the iterated (or repeated)
Prisoner Dilemma (IPD) [5]. The rules of the Prisoner
Dilemma game are brief and simple yet the parallels that
can be drawn to human behaviour are manifold. The
evolutionary aspect of the IPD is commonly introduced
by imitative behaviour of the players or a reproduction
process. Here we investigate a restriction on the play-
ers’ ability to imitate, in which imitators can only use
information obtained by interacting with the role model.
We incorporate this adjustment in the approximate mean
value equation [6] that describes the time evolution of
strategy concentrations. Particularly we consider the
simplest case of a one step memory where players remem-
ber what happened in the last encounter of the game. We
show that while populations eventually reach a cooper-
ative equilibrium, GT is the dominant strategy and the
only surviving strategy in the weak-selection regime with
partial imitation.
The Prisoner Dilemma and other symmetric 2 × 2
games (such as the Chicken or Snowdrift game and the
Stag-Hunt game) are defined by the following set of rules.
When two players play a game each of them chooses to co-
operate (C) or defect (D). Based on these two choices the
two players are attributed a payoff. A cooperating player
scores R (S) if his opponent cooperates (defects) and a
defecting player scores T (P ) if his opponent cooperates
(defects). Usually R is called the Reward for coopera-
tion, S the Sucker’s payoff, T the Temptation to defect
and P the Punishment for mutual defection. The Pris-
oner Dilemma game imposes the following restrictions on
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the payoff parameters: T > R > P > S and 2R > T +P
to prevent collusion. In the restrictions on the payoff
parameters roots the tragedy of the Prisoner Dilemma.
The strategy with the highest expectation for a player
is D, while the strategy that yields the highest payoff
for the population is C. The PD is a thus non-zero sum
game as one player’s loss does not equal his opponent’s
gain. As defection dominates cooperation, defection is
the rational strategy to choose for any player and mu-
tual defection is the only Nash equilibrium. Cooperation
is however a widespread phenomenon in nature and the
study of the emergence of cooperation in a population of
selfish individuals has been one of the key objectives in
evolutionary game theory over the past few decades.
Nowak and his collaborators have contributed enor-
mously to this topic [4, 7–13] and particularly they
found five rules of cooperation [14]. Among them, di-
rect [12, 14, 15] and indirect reciprocity [14, 16] may lead
to cooperative behaviour. In complex networks, coopera-
tors can support each other in more than one dimension,
as for example in [9, 10, 12, 13, 17–19]. Qin et al. observe
the emergence of cooperation among players with the
ability to recall their payoff over several generations[20].
If players may recall what happened in the last game
they may employ the famous Tit-For-Tat (TFT), Pavlov
and Grim Trigger (GT) strategies. More sophisticated
players that make decisions based on their own and their
opponent’s moves in recent games are used in [21–23].
We follow a similar approach in this paper. Our play-
ers decide how to play based only on the outcome of the
most recent game.
In evolutionary game theory it is common to define
a measure for fitness that is a monotonously increasing
function of the payoff and to assume that higher fitness
leads to higher reproduction rates. Approximate mean
value or replicator equations may be used to predict the
fate of different strategies for large, well mixed popula-
tions. Players with tendency to imitate promising strate-
gies are commonly used at the microscopic level. However
if strategies more complex than simply cooperate or de-
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fect – so called meta-strategies – are used, imitating may
turn out to be tricky. Imagine the situation of a novice
chess player trying to learn from more experienced partic-
ipants in a chess tournament. The novice may gradually
improve his game by incorporating the behaviour of bet-
ter participants in his own strategy, but he will not be
able to extract and learn the complete strategy of other
players immediately. In the same spirit, the partial imi-
tation learning process involves imitation of the exposed
part of the role model’s strategy. A detailed example is il-
lustrated in section II B. In the context of the PD game,
we introduce the approximate mean value equation for
the partial Imitation Rule (pIR) and compare it with the
the traditional Imitation Rule (tIR), where the complete
strategy can be copied by the learner.
The rest of the present paper is structured as follows:
in section II we describe our methods, results are pre-
sented in section III and discussed in section IV. We draw
our conclusion in section V.
II. METHODS
In section II A we give a precise description of memory
and define the possible one-step strategies that appear
in this paper. The partial Imitation Rule (pIR) is de-
scribed in detail in section II B and the arising equations
describing macroscopic dynamics are discussed in II C.
A. Memory
The ensemble of possible strategies for players with n
steps memory is denoted asMn. As mentioned previously
we allow our agents to play moves based on their own
previous move and the move of their opponent. Therefore
we need an encoding scheme for M1 strategies. As every
player has two choices for each move (D or C) there are 4
possible outcomes (DD, DC, CD and CC) with payoffs
P, T, S and R every time the game is played. Thus we
need 4 responses SP , ST , SS and SR for the DD, DC,
CD and CC histories of the last game respectively. The
agents also need to know how to start playing if there is
no history. We add an additional first move S0. Adding
up to a total of 5 moves for a one-step memory strategy.
A strategy in M1 is thus denoted as S0|SPSTSSSR where
S0 is the first move and SP , ST , SS and SR are the moves
that follow DD, DC, CD and CC histories respectively.
Thus there are |M1| = 25 = 32 possible strategies as
there are two choices for each Si, either C or D. In
table I this scheme is illustrated along with three famous
strategies Grim-Trigger, Tit-For-Tat and Pavlov and the
groups of 4 strategies that always defect (cooperate) in
practice. The aforementioned encoding scheme is easily
generalized to Mn. A treatment of players with two-step,
three-step and even longer memory can be found in [21–
23]. Note that the total number of possible strategies
|Mn| increases exponentially with n.
TABLE I. Strategy sequences in M1. Omitted fields may be
either C or D.
History: - DD DC CD CC
Move: S0 SP ST SS SR
GT C D D D C
TFT C D C D C
Pavlov C C D D C
always defect D D D
always cooperate C C C
nice C C
retaliating D
B. partial Imitation Rule (pIR)
As mentioned earlier pIR should be a reasonable re-
striction of the agents’ abilities to imitate. We ex-
plain in more detail using a concrete example. Con-
sider Alice using strategy D|DDDD = SA0 |SAP SAT SAS SAR
playing against Bob, who is himself a TFT (C|DCDC
= SB0 |SBP SBT SBS SBR ) strategist. The transition graph for
this encounter is shown in figure 1. From Alice’s point
DD
(P,P)
DC
(T,S)
CD
(S,T)
CC
(R,R)
FIG. 1. Transition graph between the D|DDDD strategist
Alice and the TFT (C|DCDC) strategist Bob. In parentheses
the payoff of Alice, Bob from the corresponding state. The
payoff from the recurrent state is P for both strategies.
of view the first outcome is SA0 SB0 = DC, hence she
uses SAT = D for her next move. Similarly Bob uses
SBS = D. The outcome of the second game is thus
SAT SBS = DD. Both players then use their SP move D for
the third game. All subsequent outcomes are therefore
SAP SBP = DD and Alice’s and Bob’s recurrent state pay-
off, i.e. the average payoff per game in the limit where in-
finitely many games are played between the two, is there-
fore P . In summary, Alice has plays SA0 SAT SAP SAP ... and
Bob plays SA0 SAS SAP SAP .... In the framework of pIR Al-
ice now imitates Bob. As she has only witnessed him
play his S0, SP and SS move she will only adopt these
moves from Bob’s strategy. Her strategy will be changed
in the imitation process as
SA0 |SAP SAT SAS SAR −→ SB0 |SBP SAT SBS SAR , or
D|DDDD TFT−−−→ C|DDDD
where i
k−→ j means that strategy i turns into strategy j
by imitating strategy k. The next round Alice will thus
be playing C|DDDD. We see that the result of such an
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imitation process may differ from a complete imitation of
the role model’s strategy (in this case Alice would simply
become a TFT player) even in the simple case of players
with one-step memory. To avoid confusion we refer to the
rule that allows the imitator to copy the entire strategy
of the role model traditional Imitation Rule (tIR). The
example illustrates how pIR strips the imitators from a
supernatural ability to “mind read” the role models and
thereby extract hidden parts of their strategy. Note that
in the case where players do not have memory, i.e. are
simply cooperators or defectors, there is no need for a
distinction between tIR and pIR. If agents with different
memory lengths are interacting we need to specify how an
agent Alice with a n-step memory imitates an agent Bob
with a longer m-step memory if the sequence of Bob’s
moves witnessed by Alice cannot be mapped on an n-
step memory strategy. As only one-step memory players
are used here we do not address the issue this paper.
In order for our players to effectively make use of their
memory and strategies, players need to play repeatedly
against their opponents. We denote the number of games
played per encounter of two players as f . This number
affects the performance of different strategies and fate
of the population in a complex way and this discussion
is beyond the scope of this paper. If we assume that
two players always play many games against each other
before they switch to another opponent, then the play-
ers will mostly find themselves in recurrent states of the
transition graph. In the limit where f → ∞ the aver-
age payoff per game played is the average payoff scored
in the recurrent states of the transition graphs. Thus in
our large, well mixed population the payoff of a player
playing strategy i is well approximated by
Ui =
|M1|∑
j=1
ρjUij . (1)
where ρj is the (number) density, concentration or frac-
tion of j-strategists in the population and Uij is the av-
erage recurrent state payoff obtained by an i-strategist
playing against a j-strategist. We fix our PD payoff pa-
rameters to a set of commonly used values that offer high
temptation to defecting players: T = 5, R = 3, P =
1, S = 0. The same set was also used in Axelrod’s fa-
mous computer tournaments [2].
C. Macroscopic Dynamics
At the macroscopic level we are interested in players
that do not necessarily make perfect decisions when im-
itating other players. To account for these irrational de-
cisions we assign a certain probability to every possible
imitation process depending on the payoff difference be-
tween the imitator and the role model. If player i has
been determined as a possible imitator of player j the
imitation (with tIR or pIR) occurs with a probability
given by a monotonically increasing smoothing function
g(∆U), where ∆U = Uj − Ui is the payoff difference be-
tween player i and j. This translates into the fact that
the more successful players are, the more likely they are
to be imitated. With our choice of smoothing function g
the imitation probability is given by
P (i imitates j) = g(∆U) =
1
1 + exp
(−∆U
K
)
=
1
1 + exp
(
Ui−Uj
K
) (2)
whereK > 0 is a temperature-like noise factor controlling
the extent of irrationality among the players[6].
By using this combination of pIR and smoothing func-
tion g defined above associated to the payoff of the play-
ers we basically make assumptions about the availability
and reliability of information. The details about encoun-
ters between two players Alice and Bob (i.e. the exact
moves played during the encounter) are known to Al-
ice and Bob only. We also assume that Alice and Bob
do not make any mistakes when memorizing moves and
when using their strategy to play. However the informa-
tion about the total payoff of players is available globally
to all players but associated with an uncertainty whose
extent is controlled by the noise factor K. In this way
the players’ first hand information is reliable but severely
limited if the imitation process is based on pIR and in-
formation about the wealth of the players is available
globally but this information is not perfectly reliable.
It is possible to determine macroscopic dynamics from
the microscopic update rules for both tIR and pIR [6] (see
appendix A). The approximate mean value equations for
tIR is
dρtIRi
dt
= ρi
∑
j
ρj [g(Ui − Uj)− g(Uj − Ui)] (3)
where all the sums are carried out over all considered
strategies. If as in the case of pIR the imitator may
adopt a strategy that is different from the role models
strategy the approximate mean value equation is
dρpIRi
dt
=
∑
j
ρj
∑
k
ρkg(Uj − Uk)p(k, j, i)
−ρi
∑
j
ρjg(Uj − Ui) . (4)
where
p : M ×M ×M → [0, 1] (5)
is a function whose value p(k, j, i) is the probability that
k-strategist will become an i-strategist by imitating a
j-strategist and M is the space of all allowed strategies.
Because the player must use a strategy after the imitation
process we have the restriction∑
i
p(k, j, i) = 1 ∀k, j ∈M . (6)
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For our model of partial imitation, this probability is
reduced to a simple form
ppIR : M ×M ×M → {0, 1} (7)
ppIR(k, j, i) =

1 if k-strategist imitating
j-strategist becomes
i-strategist
0 otherwise
. (8)
The approximate mean value equation for pIR is thus
dρpIRi
dt
=
∑
j
ρj
∑
k
ρkg(Uj − Uk)ppIR(k, j, i)
−ρi
∑
j
ρjg(Uj − Ui) . (9)
III. RESULTS
The dynamics of the two imitation rules are compared
in section III A and the equilibrium strategy fractions
presented in section III B.
A. Dynamics
We would like to observe the dynamics of the two im-
itation rules. Upon examining the smoothing function
(2) we distinguish three different cases. In the low noise
limit we have rational players as lim
K→ 0
g(∆U) = Θ (∆U)
where Θ (·) is the heaviside step function. In high noise
limit we have random drift1 because lim
K→∞
g(∆U) = 12 .
In figure 2 the concentration of a selection of important
strategies is given in three cases of low, medium and high
noise. We refer to the cumulative concentration of al-
ways defecting strategies (see table I) as ρall−D. When
tIR is used ρall−D follows a similar evolution for all three
noise factors. The always defecting strategies die out af-
ter their fraction increases initially to about 0.4. With
more noise this process takes more time. If pIR is used
we observe a similar evolution for low and medium noise.
As the noise increases, however, we find that the popu-
lation is temporarily dominated by the always defecting
strategies before they die out eventually. By observing
the fraction of GT players we notice a simultaneous ex-
tinction of all-D strategies and a rise of the fraction of
GT players followed by an equilibrium state, dominated
by the GT strategy.
1 Note that if pIR is used then this random drift is possible only
between certain strategies.
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
ρ
a
ll
−
D
10−1 100 101 102 103 104
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
t
ρ
G
T
rule\K 0.01 1 100
tIR
pIR
FIG. 2. Strategy concentrations ρ as function of time t for
different noise factors K. Results from numerical integration
of the approximate mean value equations for tIR (3) and pIR
(9) with initial condition ρi(t = 0) =
1
|M1| for i = 1, 2..., n
where |M1| = 32 is the number of strategies in M1.
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pIR
FIG. 3. Selection of non-zero equilibrium fractions as function
of noise factor K. Results from numerical integration of the
approximate mean value equations for tIR, equation 3 and
pIR, equation 9 with initial condition ρi(t = 0) =
1
|M1| for
i = 1, 2..., |M1| where |M1| = 32 is the number of strategies
in M1.
B. Equilibrium strategy distribution
The results from numerical integration of the approxi-
mate mean value equations equation 3 and 9 suggest that
if initially all the strategies are present in equal fractions,
the system is likely to reach a stationary equilibrium. We
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can see in figure 2 that the equilibrium fraction of GT
varies with the noise factor K. Figure 3 shows the equi-
librium fractions of all nice and retaliating strategies and
the C|CCCC strategy as function of noise factor K for
both imitation rules2. We denote the equilibrium fraction
of strategy X as ρ∗X. If we only refer to the equilibrium
fraction under traditional (partial) imitation we add a
tIR (pIR) superscript: ρ∗tIRX (ρ
∗pIR
X ).
GT is the most abundant strategy at equilibrium for
both imitation rules and over the whole reasonable range
of the noise factor K. For traditional imitation we no-
tice that the lower the noise factor K, the higher the
equilibrium fraction of GT ρ∗GT and for moderate to high
noise factor, the equilibrium fractions are independent
of the noise factor. These two observations are reversed
for partial imitation, i.e. for pIR, the higher the noise
factor K the higher ρ∗GT and at low temperatures the
equilibrium fractions are independent of K. We notice
further that for traditional (partial) imitation GT is the
only dominating strategy and ρ∗GT is very close to 1 if the
noise factor is small (high). With traditional imitation
the equilibrium fractions rank independent of the noise
factor as ρ∗tIRGT > ρ
∗tIR
TFT > ρ
∗tIR
Pavlov > ρ
∗tIR
C|CCDC > ρ
∗tIR
C|CCCC.
For partial imitation this is no longer true. Pavlov is now
more abundant than TFT at equilibrium.
IV. DISCUSSION
With pIR there are |M1|2 = 1024 possible imitation
processes, but not all of these are important for the evo-
lution of the population. In an early phase the naive
strategies die out and the always defecting strategies be-
come more popular. After this initial phase of evolution
the nice and retaliating strategies take over. The most
important transitions are shown in figure 4. We can see
that some of the always defecting strategies may directly
be turned into GT or Pavlov by imitating one of the
nice retaliating strategies, however none of the always
defecting strategies can be turned into TFT or C|CCDC
by imitating one of the nice and retaliating strategies.
In general, it is more difficult for any always defecting
strategies to be turned into TFT or C|CCDC than to be
turned into Pavlov or GT. While this observation can-
not explain the fate of all different strategies, it serves
to explain – together with the initial rise of always de-
fecting strategies – the lower equilibrium densities of the
C|CCDC and TFT strategy when pIR is used. From this
observation we may also conjecture that performance or
fitness do not assure survival if the strategy cannot be
easily learned by an important group of strategies. Thus
the “learnability” of a strategy becomes an important
2 With pIR and low noise a few other strategies have small
non-zero equilibrium densities, namely C|DDCC, C|DCCC and
C|CDCC. With tIR these three other always cooperating strate-
gies have the same equilibrium fractions as the C|CCCC strategy.
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FIG. 4. Flow chart of important strategies under pIR. An
arrow A
C
(D)−−→B is drawn if an A-strategist adapts strategy B
when imitating a C-strategist (or a D-strategist). For simplic-
ity we write A
B−→B as A→B. If A is nice and retaliating strat-
egy and B is one of the two transitional strategies (C|DDDD
or C|CDDD) we also have A→B. These arrows are omitted
to avoid an overly crowded figure. The term all-D is used to
denote all four always defecting strategies.
factor that may have strong influence on the competi-
tiveness. The Pavlov strategy is not successful in the
high noise setting because it scores considerably lower
than GT or TFT in a population with a large fraction of
always defecting strategies.
V. CONCLUSION
We have shown that the partial Imiation Rule, an alter-
native to the common imitative behaviour for two player
games, can be described by an approximative mean value
equation. Dynamics and stationary properties are in
general subject to many parameters such as payoff pa-
rameters, noise and initial conditions. Our investigation
is by no means exhaustive but the approximate mean
value equation predicts that the evolution of well mixed
populations depends heavily on the employed imitation
rule. It is therefore important to discuss the imitation
behaviour whenever meta-strategies, that are more com-
plex than simply cooperate and defect, are being used.
The idea of using tIR or pIR (or any other imitation
rule) is a question of the model one is trying to inves-
tigate. If we assume that offsprings are created from
generation to generation it is meaningful to assume that
they will be using the same strategy as the parent. This
scenario is equivalent to using tIR. If on the other hands
the players are surviving over several generations and are
using imitation then they should adapt their strategies
via a learning process (as for example pIR) rather than
complete imitation or tIR.
5
The discussion about the imitative behaviour can also
be taken to the spatial variant of the prisoner dilemma
game, especially because in the spatial variant with sta-
tionary topology it is more natural to use imitation rather
than reproduction. In the spatial variant one can argue
that the imitator should, at least to some extent, have
access to information from the games played by the role
model with other players. We leave these topics to future
work.
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Appendix A: Macroscopic dynamics
In this section we determine the macroscopic dynam-
ics of pIR from the microscopic interactions between the
players. Our approach is mainly based on [6]. For sim-
plicity we consider only players on a fully connected net-
work (every player interacts with every other player and
himself). The transition rate of strategy i to another
strategy j is given by
w(i→ j) = ρjg(Uj − Ui) , (A1)
where ρj is the density of j-strategists, the smoothing
function has been given previously and it is understood
that the payoffs depend on the densities ρ1, ρ2, ..., ρ|Mn|,
where |Mn| is the number of possible strategies. The
approximate mean value equation for a strategy i in the
general case is
dρi
dt
=
∑
j 6=i
[ρjw(j → i)− ρiw(i→ j)] (A2)
Inserting equation (A1) into equation (A2) yields a
non-linear differential equation for the time derivative of
every strategy3.
However in the case of pIR this does in general not
yield useful results as it does not take any account of the
fact that an i-strategist who imitates a j-strategist will
in general not become a j-strategist himself. In order
for us to take account of this we need to find a correct
expression for the term w(i → j) in equation (A2). We
define the following mapping
p : M ×M ×M → [0, 1] . (A3)
3 Note that if proportional imitation is used rather than smoothed
imitation this procedure simply yields the replicator equation.
The value p(k, j, i) is the probability that a k-strategist
becomes an i-strategist by imitating a j-strategist. The
transtition rate for k-strategists becoming i-strategists
by imitating j strategists is
w(k
j−→ i) = ρjg(Uj − Uk)p(k, j, i) . (A4)
The the total transition rate for k-strategists migrating
to strategy i is thus
w(k → i) =
∑
j
ρjg(Uj − Uk)p(k, j, i) , (A5)
and the total fraction that migrates to strategy i is
f+(→ i) =
∑
k 6=i
ρk
∑
j
ρjg(Uj − Uk)p(k, j, i)
=
∑
j
ρj
∑
k 6=i
ρkg(Uj − Uk)p(k, j, i) (A6)
In contrast to the case of tIR a second summation over
appears here. Under pIR children strategies can be differ-
ent from both of the parent strategies. Therefore we need
to consider all the strategies (except strategy i) as imita-
tor when considering the migration to strategy i when the
role model uses strategy j. This leads immediately to in-
teresting phenomena as for example the possible rebirth
of extinct strategies. Next we define a transition rate for
i-strategists migrating to another strategy by imitating
strategy j:
w(i
j−→) = ρjg(Uj − Ui)[1− p(i, j, i)] (A7)
where the term in brackets takes care of the important
case where the i-strategist learns nothing new by imitat-
ing a j-strategist and therefore keeps his previous strat-
egy. The fraction migrating away from strategy i is thus
f−(i→) = ρi
∑
j
ρjg(Uj − Ui)[1− p(i, j, i)] (A8)
The approximate mean value equation then becomes
dρi
dt
= f+(→ i)− f−(i→)
=
∑
j
ρj
∑
k 6=i
ρkg(Uj − Uk)p(k, j, i)
− ρi
∑
j
ρjg(Uj − Ui)[1− p(i, j, i)] . (A9)
The restrictions on the summation over k and the factor
in brackets are actually not necessary. We rewrite
dρi
dt
=
∑
j
ρj
∑
k
ρkg(Uj − Uk)p(k, j, i)
−
∑
j
ρiρjg(Uj − Ui)p(i, j, i)
−
∑
j
ρiρjg(Uj − Ui)
+
∑
j
ρiρjg(Uj − Ui)p(i, j, i) (A10)
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and see that two terms on the second and forth line can-
cel. Finally we obtain the general approximate mean
value equation:
dρi
dt
=
∑
j
ρj
∑
k
ρkg(Uj−Uk)p(k, j, i)−ρi
∑
j
ρjg(Uj−Ui) .
(A11)
By specifying the values of p we choose the imitation rule.
For tIR we simply have
ptIR(k, j, i) = δij , (A12)
where δ is the Kronecker delta and the equation reduces
to the approximate mean value equation in [6]. For pIR
we have
ppIR(k, j, i) =

1 if k-strategist imitating
j-strategist with pIR
becomes i-strategist
0 otherwise
.(A13)
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